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Summary
Standard growth models, including growth models such as Kaldor's and Arrow's
that make technical progress endogenous, rely for support on their results being
in accord with the observed face of a roughly-constant capital-output ratio.
This paper argues that the idea of a constant K/Y ratio is (a) fundamentally
wrong in a physical-technical sense, and (b) meaningless in an economic sense,
because a roughly-constant K/Y ratio is a necessary outcome of an economy with
roughly-constant distributive shares, as is the observed fact.
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A CONSTANT LONG-RUN K/Y RATIO IS A MEANINGLESS OBSERVATION*
Julian L. Simon
INTRODUCTION
Received growth theory Is about steady states. A steady state Is
characterized by a constant capital-output ratio. And one of the key
putative "stylized facts" upon which growth theory builds, and against
which it tests its propositions, is—in Solow's words—that "the ratio
of capital to output shows no systematic trend" (1970, p. 2).
This paper argues, however, that this "stylized fact" has no eco-
nomic meanings The observed monetized capital-output ratio is not an
appropriate comparison with the physical growth-theoretic results. And
to the relevant extent that it is meaningful to discuss changes in the
physical capital-output ratio, it probably has been falling, as theory"
leads us to expect. The paper reconciles these ideas, showing how the
monetized K/Y ratio can be constant or nearly constant, even if the
relevant physical ratio is falling.
The argument seems odd at first reading; indeed the entire matter
seemed very odd to the writer when first coming up^on it, simply because
the conclusion is at odds with all conventional practice. But it is
hoped that the reader will not be offended by this unconventionality.
*I appreciate a helpful reading from Hans Brems, and conversations
on this topic with Richard Kihlstrom, James Kurish, Leonard Ilirman, and
Walter Primeaux.
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Notatlon
L = labor force
Y = total output In market i during period j
K = stock of capital
Y
V = ^ = reciprocal of capital-output ratio
w = the wage rate
r = rate of return on capital
c,a,0, = constants
THE ARGUMENT
Typical citations to show a constant K/Y ratio are Denison's data
for the U.S. and 8 European countries for 1950-1962; Barger's for 1950-
1964; Mathews' and Feinstein's U.K. data for 1856-present (all cited by
Solow, 1970, pp. 5-7); and the CED-Denison data for the U.S. from 1909
to 1958 (U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 189). Eltis (1973, p. 266)
cites estimates by Kendrick and Sato (1963) and Klein and Kosobud (1961)
as showing that the K/Y ratio has fallen in the U.S. in the 20th century.
But Kuznets (1973, pp. 121-164) concludes that we do not know whether the
monetary K/Y ratio was higher than at present even in premodern times
Csay 1688 in England). But as we shall see shortly, this argvmient is
not relevant here, because it is not meaningful.*
*One must be careful about concluding that the K/Y ratio is constant
on the basis of studies using the Cobb-Douglas production function,
which constrains the distributive shares to be constant, and thereby
biases the K/Y ratio estimate. But there is enough evidence from other
types of studies to support a conclusion that the K/Y ratio is more-or-
less constant. Most important here, however, is not whether or not the
ratio is constant, but that theorists assume it to be constant and build
models in consonance with that assumption.
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These data on the K/Y ratio all purport to show that two inde-
pendent entities—K and Y—remain in a constant relationship. In
all cases the estimates of output are in monetized valuations from
national income accounts, and the estimates of capital come from
various surveys of assets measured in money. These modes of measure-
ment are of the utmost importance for the argument.
In the long run, however, the money values of output and capital
are not, and cannot be , in a very different ratio than is observed
because of market forces inherent in competitive markets . That is to
say, the K/Y ratio does not indicate a constant physical relationship
between capital and output. (And please keep in mind that a production
function is basically a physical-technological construct). The reason
is this: In a competitive market, the price of output is determined
only by the total cost of inputs; if the price of bulldozers falls,
the price of bulldozing will fall. Hence if the money cost of the capital
or labor input falls due to technological change, the money value per
unit of output in that market must fall, also. The rest of the argument
is an elaboration of this simple observation., and a straightforward
proof that, on quite realistic assumptions, the two quantities change
by the same proportion. This is the cause of the observed constant
K/Y ratio.
A word about the valuation and measurement of capital;. The estimates
of the capital shares of a given country made by government organizations
and individual scholars are, of course, subject to a large number of
difficulties. Ideally one would measure the current market value of the
various chunks of capital, thereby reflecting current technology and
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capital condition. But the actual published estimates derive largely
from Ca) estimates of depreciation, which are not likely to come very
close to market facts, together with (b) original purchase prices,
whose meaning is much affected by technological change and inflation.
These difficulties are among the many which muddy the meaning of a
capital-stock estimate. But in the long run these errors of estima-
tion must tend to wash out and leave some rough correspondence between
the book value and the market value of a country's capital, as is
assumed by those who estimate capital stocks; this is all that is
required for discussion here. Furthermore, to the extent that there
is indeed relative constancy of the K/Y ratio, as is claimed for that
stylized fact, it is itself evidence that the book-value estimates
bear some stable relationship to market value.
There are also the enormous conceptual difficulties concerning
the notion of an aggregate production function which are associated
with the Cambridge controversy. But these issues need not detain us
here because the aim is not to elucidate the meaning of the capital
term in the K/Y ratio, or to discuss the meaning of aggregate produc-
tion functions, but rather only to explain why the monetized K/Y
ratio is likely to remain unchanged with time.
Before stating the argument more precisely. It is illuminating
to look at a related situation where capital and output also remain
in a constant ratio. In agriculture, the market value of a unit of
land is roughly four times the market value of the output of that
unit of land, in countries ranging from China to Australia, in all
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the years for which data are available.* The explanation of this
constancy is that when the value of output changes, the price that
is bid for land changes in response. Therefore, the ratio of land
capital in money to farm output in money tells nothing whatever about
the physical facts of production, but only about capital markets and
portfolio behavior.
Land may not seem perfectly analogous to industrial capital be-
cause the overall amounts in acres vary less from year to year than do
physical measures of capital. But as with industrial capital, land's
market price is influenced both by the demand for it as well as by
the supply-side cost of clearing new land and of improving old farm-
land with irrigation and drainage. Perhaps the main difference between
*In China in 1921-25, the K/Y ratio in Chinese dollars for the
average farm acre (excluding livestock and supplies) was $1736/$376 =
<4.6; for land alone, it was $1374/$376 = 3.7. In Orissa, India,
1958-59, the average investment per acre was Rs. 535, and in land alone
it was Rs. 474, whereas output there was Rs. 125 per acre, a K/Y of 4.3
In the Punjab, 1955-56, the value of land averaged Rs. 840 per acre,
where the value of output per acre was Rs. 193, giving a K/Y of about
4.3. In Andhra Pradesh in 1959-60, the K/Y ratio (land plus all other
capital) was 6.4. In the years 1910-16, the ratio of land value to
output ranged from 3.05 to 3.56 in Australia, Canada, France, Russia,
Switzerland, and the United States countries in which land was surely
a smaller proportion of total capital than in India or China. The
U.S. Midwest is the only major exception; land prices there continue
to confound all analysts. (Paragraph largely drawn from Simon, 1977,
p. 257, with references given therein).
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land and industrial capital is that the market in farmland is mostly
in old farmland where' the costs have been sunk long ago, whereas
most industrial capital transactions are in new capital.*
*Some would question whether land should even be considered
capital in this context, making the argument that land is a natural
endowment and the returns to it are a rent to the descendants (natural
or financial) of the person who simply affixed a mark to it. But this
argument simply will not work. First, if the land were simply used
and used, it would soon be useless for agriculture. Land must constant-
ly be maintained, and this maintenance is gross investment. Second,
when it was originally claimed, the land had to be cleared and made
useful for agriculture. And as we know from comtemporary land-clearing
projects in Siberia, Brazil, Africa, and elsewhere, the cost of land
clearance is not far from the market value of comparable land presently
in use—as one may expect. Costs per acre (2.471 acres equal one
hectare) among a sample of land-development projects were: Guatemala,
$32 and $91; Nigeria, $118; Sudan, $218; Ceylon, $307; Morocco, $307;
United States, $612; Kenya, $973. The weighted average of a world
sample of projects in settled areas was $400 per acre. More recently,
a considerable lower estimate has been made by the FAQ: "to add 5-7
million hectares to food production woxild cost between $137 and $312
per hectare". For irrigation alone, on presently cultivated lands
in India, the estimate is $250-$300 per acre. The weighted average
cost for a variety of world projects was $325 per acre, and omitting
one large project it was $581 per acre. And though some land may be
cheaper to clear than others (e.g., the U.S. Midwest was cheaper than
the Brazilian jungle) even the cheapest-to-clear land was far from
the "free gift" that some historians speak of. The costs of disease,
danger from Indians, isolation, lack of markets, and so forth, were
very substantial. Proof is found in eighteenth-century New England
where people remained even though population grew to the point at
which it was considered "overcrowded" and land prices rose, because
the perceived cost of opening the new land was greater. Additional
evidence is the relationship of the cost of purchasing underdeveloped
land to the cost of readying it for farming. In the 18th century
a representative 40-acre US field cost $50, but fencing, clearing
and cabin-building cost $250. (Footnote largely from Simon, 1977, p.
240. References given therein.)
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Now let us return to the industrial K/Y ratio. Assume that
labor's share of output is g; we do not fully understand why 3 should be
near-constant over time and similar in various countries, but that it
is indeed such a near-constant is a fact that we can safely build upon;*
Figure 1 shows some relevant data graphed by Brems. They suggest that
labor's share is reasonably constant over time in the U.S., and among
Denison's sample of nine Western countries. Of course these data do not
prove constancy, nor could any data; but the hypothesis of a trend in
the U.S., or meaningful differences among the nine countries, certainly
cannot be confirmed with tests of statistical significance. This should
accord to this constancy of labor's share a status as a stylized fact
at least as secure as the constancy of the monetized K/Y ratio. Hence
this should not be a sticking-point in the agrument.**
There can be, and are, many theories of this constancy in labor's
share, but none of them use the capital-output ratio as an argument, and
hence the argument of this paper is not affected by which theory of this
constancy the reader prefers. Therefore, let us simply say that, one way
or another, labor always negotiates or fights or competes itself into share
of total output.
*If labor's share has increased, it is consistent with diminishing
inquality, which certainly has some political-historical roots that may
be considered exogenous here.
**I regret that the data shown here are not up-to-the-minute. But
they are the best product of a recent search of the literature by my
colleague Hans Brems, in preparation for a forthcoming book (Brems,
1980).
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Figure 1
We can also take as a reasonable stylized fact that the rate of
return on capital has no trend; U.S. data supporting this assumption
are shoT.m in Figure 2, again by way of Br ems; the comments made above
about the data on labor's share also apply to these data.
Figure 2
We can now write
(2) Y = wL + rK and
C3) wL = BY.
Hence
C4) rK = aY, since Y = aY + &Y.
Assume that these relationships hold in representative market 1, in
period 1. Let us further suppose that Cwhere market is the superscript,
and period the subscript) in market 1 the amount of capital needed to
produce output Y, falls sharply, either because labor or capital becomes
more efficient. To fix the imagination, let us visualize an example
cited by IBM: "A set of computations that cost $1.26 on an IBM computer
in 1952 costs only 7/lOths of a cent today."* Assume for convenience
that demand is completely inelastic. If so, the value of the capital
in use will fall sharply to some ciL
, where c is scua constant less than
*Advertisement in New York Times Magazine , November 11, 1978, p. 63.
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unity, and the value of output will also fall until the new price of
computing services eqiials the new cost. We can figure the new value of
output as follows (writing the argximent in an algebraically-extended
form as an aid to the intuition in this counter-intuitive matter)
:
By assumption
(3a) (wL)^ = gY^ and
(2a) Y^ = (wL)J + r!^.
By definition and previous assumption
(5) r^ = aY^ = rcK^
and
(4a) tY^ = aY^.
Divide (4a) by (5)
rK^ oyJ
rcK^ aY^
cancel and rearrange
(7) ^ = =^r
By definition
Y^ Y^11 12 -
(8) V, = -=- , and v„ = —r—
and hence by definition and cancellation
^Q^ 1 '^^ 1(9) ^2 =
-T = \'
cK^
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So we see that the capital-output ratio in market-value terms remains
constant when there is an Increase in productivity. It would be more
complex to extend the analysis to the economy as a whole, but the matter
would seem sufficiently obvious intuitively so that such a demonstration
is not necessary.*
TEE REAL COURSE OF THE PHYSICAL K/Y RATIO
Now that we have seen that there is no empirical reason in the ob-
served monetairy K/Y ratios to believe that the physical K/Y ratio is con-
stant, we are free to theorize about the course of the physical K/Y ratio
as economic development proceeds. One may choose not to engage in this
speculation at all, a position that is perfectly consistent with one
implication of this paper, that is, that a growth model may iiq)ly a de-
creasing K/Y ratio; one can simply ignore the K/Y ratio completely. But
it seems to me that such speculation is at least interesting even if it
has no inqjlication, because it illuminates the process of economic de-
velopment
.
A falling physical capital-output ratio seems to me to be an obvious
technological fact—or at least it is obvious once we put behind us the
idea of a capital-output ratio in value terms. To show this we must
proceed in step-by-step fashion, making only those comparisons that can
legitimately be made, and not making illegitimate comparisons. This
*Brem3 (1973, p. 171) also noticed the discrepancy between the
money and physical concepts of the capital coefficient, and he suggests
a reconciliation by way of the rise in the prices of producer goods
relative to consumer goods. This explanation is not at all incompatible
with the explanation suggested above. But ray inspection of the data
suggests that the prices of producer and consumer goods are not likely
to explain much of the effect under discussion here.
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means that we cannot compare entire capital stocks, largely because
new consumer products are introduced with the passage of time.
Let us begin with identical tools used to make identical products
at different moments of history. Consider the important example of farm-
land. A given acre of Illinois land produces—even after other physical
inputs are allowed for—a much larger amount of com now than in earlier
years. And if an Amish farmer chooses to work with horses, the horses
together with the Illinois land produce more output per acre and per
horse (with equal or less man hours) than in previous years. And there
is no reason not to attribute this increased output-capital ratio to
labor-augmenting technological progress—better calendars, better knowl-
edge of hybrid seeds, information about optimal planting depths, int-
provements in motive power, and so on... Or take the homely example of
the claw hammer, which has changed little in form for many years; the
amount of fastening that a carpenter does in a day with a claw hammer
has risen considerably over the years because of iii5)rovements in nails
,
materials to be fastened, materials transportation, and so on... And
still other examples: With the same endowment of human legs we get
faster miles run, higher heights jumped, and longer distances leaped,
due to better knowledge of track techniques and training methods (but
hopefully not because of new drugs). With the same ox or baby we now
get more lifetime days of work due to better knowledge of nutrition
and disease prevention. We build the same house with less stone, due
to advanced civil engineering knowledge of stresses.
The same must be true of almost every tool that we now use, vmchanged
from earlier years, to produce the same output. And for most of these
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tools additional uses have been discovered over the years, which can only
be interpreted as a reduction in the capital-output ratio.
If one were to consider tools for the saice purpose that have inf
proved over the years—diesel locomotives compared to steam locomotives
or horses—the comparison is more strained, yet it suggests even more
strongly an increased technological output-capital ratio. If a farmer
replaces a team of horses with a tractor that uses the same number of
man-hours, then implicit in the replacement decision is that the new
capital dominates the old, in the Pareto sense of having a higher output/
capital ratio, and for this farmer the price of output may be taken as
constant with respect to this decision. Unless the decision also im-
proves a drop in man-hours (which then embroils us in relative prices)
the shift to the tractor may be seen immediately as a reduction in the
capital-output ratio. For much of our capital stock the choice does
involve relative cost valuations of labor and capital, and much other
of our capital produces goods and services that were not produced in
the past. Hence pairwise technological comparisons are not possible
for much of our capital stock, and therefore no time-series comparison
of the K/Y ratio can be made for that portion of our capital. But that
in no way vitiates the obvious conclusion that where comparisons are
reasonable and fair, the technological capital-output ratio (the K/Y
ratio that everyone agrees is relevant, rather than the monetized ratio)
shows a decline with the increase in per-worker output and income.
Therefore it is most naturjil and reasonable to accept as a stylized
fact a decreased capital-output ratio with the passage of time.
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If, however, the reader does not find the discussion in this
section congenial, it may be disregarded completely. It has no bearing
on the main point of this piece,
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The apparent constancy of the observed capital-output ratio is mis-
leading. Capital and output measured in value terms maintain a constant
relationship because the price of output is a function only of the cost
of inputs in competitive markets. The appropriate capital and output
concepts for a growth model are technological rather than value measures,
and substitution of the latter for the former (due to difficulty of
measuring the former) results in confusion, wrong-headed theory, and
unsound conclusions.
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